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Managing Cybersecurity Risks Using ISO/SAE 21434

Anytime
This introductory course outlines the methods specified to assess cybersecurity risk to a road vehicle product in the context of ISO/SAE 21434. This risk-based methodology is a modular component of additional topics in the standard and a necessary concept to comprehend. ...Managing Cybersecurity Risks Using ISO/SAE 21434 explains the methods and logic behind the standard and focuses on risk assessment as a basic principle that must be applied in all other areas of 21434.
Standard

Unmanned Systems (UxS) Control Segment (UCS) Architecture: Architecture Technical Governance

2020-08-12
HISTORICAL
AS6522A
This Technical Governance is part of the SAE UCS Architecture Library and is primarily concerned with the UCS Architecture Model (AS6518) starting at Revision A and its user extensions. Users of the Model may extend it in accordance with AS6513 to meet the needs of their UCS Products. UCS Products include software components, software configurations and systems that provide or consume UCS services. For further information, refer to AS6513 Revision A or later. Technical Governance is part of the UCS Architecture Framework. This framework governs the UCS views expressed as Packages and Diagrams in the UCS Architecture Model.
Standard

Requirements for a COTS Assembly Management Plan

2020-08-03
CURRENT
EIA933C
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly.
Magazine

Aerospace & Defense Technology: August 2020

2020-08-01
Reverse Engineering the Boeing E-3 Sentry's Secondary Flight Controls Vanadium - A Green Metal Critical to Aerospace and Clean Energy Thrust in Space - The Nuances of Thruster Valve Design 3D Printing Aerodynamic Improvements Cryogenic-Capable Isolators Improve the Performance of Millimeter-Wave Systems by Lowering Noise Levels Detection with Quantum Radar A new radar prototype utilizes quantum entanglement as a method of object detection. Preliminary Development of an Integrated Mobility, Lethality, and Survivability Soldier Performance Testing Platform Developing a methodology that incorporates objective measures of performance and is sensitive to changes in soldier-system equipment could help guide equipment manufacturers during product development and acquisition. Bore Elevation and Azimuth Measurement System (Beams) Newly developed laser apparatus verifies that the pointing accuracy requirement of a weapon's fire control system is met.
Journal Article

The Missing Link: Aircraft Cybersecurity at the Operational Level

2020-07-25
Abstract Aircraft cybersecurity efforts have tended to focus at the strategic or tactical levels without a clear connection between the two. ...CSSEP’s process model postulates that security is best achieved by a balance of cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, defensibility, and recoverability and that control is best established by developing security constraints versus attempting to find every vulnerability. ...CSSEP identifies the major functions needed to do effective aircraft cybersecurity and provides a flexible framework as the “missing link” to connect the strategic and tactical levels of aircraft cybersecurity.
Standard

AIRCRAFT DATA INTERFACE FUNCTION (ADIF)

2020-07-21
CURRENT
ARINC834-8
This document defines an Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF) developed for aircraft installations that incorporate network components based on commercially available technologies. This document defines a set of protocols and services for the exchange of aircraft avionics data across aircraft networks. A common set of services that may be used to access specific avionics parameters are described. The ADIF may be implemented as a generic network service, or it may be implemented as a dedicated service within an ARINC 759 Aircraft Interface Devices (AID) such as those used with an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). Supplement 8 includes improvements in the Aviation Data Broadcast Protocol (ADBP), adds support for the Media Independent Aircraft Messaging (MIAM) protocol, and contains data security enhancements. It also includes notification and deprecation of the Generic Aircraft Parameter Service (GAPS) protocol that will be deleted in a future supplement.
Standard

Unmanned Systems (UxS) Control Segment (UCS) Architecture: Architecture Description

2020-07-14
HISTORICAL
AS6512A
This document is the Architecture Description (AD) for the SAE Unmanned Systems (UxS) Control Segment (UCS) Architecture Library Revision A or, simply, the UCS Architecture. The architecture is expressed by a library of SAE publications as referenced herein. The other publications in the UCS Architecture Library Revision A are: AS6513A, AS6518A, AS6522A, and AS6969A.
Magazine

MOMENTUM: FEBRUARY 2020

2020-02-01
Tweaking, tuning, and tinkering The importance of flight testing in design decisions. Engine switch propels UW - Platteville snowmobile team to new heights Along with a new engine, the team made other changes that helped it win first place in the Spark-Ignition Class at the 2019 SAE Clean Snowmobile Challenge. Another year, another successful Cornell Baja SAE team Cornell University was among only five teams to finish in the top 10 in each of 2019's three Baja SAE competitions.
Standard

FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE (FSTD) – LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT

2019-10-16
CURRENT
ARINC434-2
This document will address measures pertaining to and directly associated with the maintainability and reliability of FSTDs throughout their entire life cycle, from initial specification and design to de-commissioning. Although the primary emphasis of this document is on full flight simulators (with motion and visual systems), it should be applicable in part or total to all FSTDs.
Book

Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation

2019-09-04
Written by Kirsten Koepsel, a lawyer and engineer whose work has focused on aviation cybersecurity, Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation addresses the big question facing aircraft manufacturers today: keep the work in house or outsource it? ...Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation discusses the differences in requirements depending on the buyer of the aircraft (governmental or not), ranging from delivery delays to risks linked to cybersecurity and the Internet of Things (IoT), including possible problems with faulty sensors and counterfeit parts.
Article

Virtual factories accelerate collaboration, advance technologies

2019-08-26
The Commonwealth Center for Advanced Manufacturing (CCAM), a non-profit consortium based in Prince George County, Virginia, uses a 3D visualization lab to expand beyond the walls of its 62,000-square-foot brick and mortar facility and deliver a collaborative development for researchers in industry, academia, and government.
Article

Lockheed Martin rolls out cybersecurity standardization model

2019-08-23
Lockheed Martin Corporation cyber security experts have released a new Cyber Resiliency Level (CRL) model. CRL a risk-based, mission-focused and cost-conscious framework that provides a structured set of methodologies and processes to help measure risk across six categories.
Article

SAE course delivers an introduction to the latest aviation cybersecurity essentials

2019-06-11
SAE International’s two-day course, DO-326A and ED-202A: An Introduction to the New and Mandatory Aviation Cyber-Security Essentials, introduces attendees to industry best practices for real-world aviation cybersecurity risk assessment, development, assurance. ...SAE International’s two-day course, DO-326A and ED-202A: An Introduction to the New and Mandatory Aviation Cyber-Security Essentials, introduces attendees to industry best practices for real-world aviation cybersecurity risk assessment, development, assurance.
Magazine

Aerospace & Defense Technology: June 2019

2019-06-01
Eyes in the Sky Rugged High-Speed Cameras Capture Critical Flight Test Video Data Panoramic Thermal Imaging Technology A New Concept in Naval Defense Coating Technology Enables Effective Missile Countermeasures FACE™ - Future Airborne Capability Environment Diminishing U.S. Combat Superiority Drives New Software Development Requirements Broadband 1.2- and 2.4-mm Gallium Nitride (GaN) Power Amplifier Designs Multi-Agent RF Propagation Simulator Electrical Characterization of Crystalline UO2, THO2 and U0.71TH0.29O2 Evaluating the suitability of advanced alloys for use in uranium-based neutron detectors. ONR Short Pulse Research, Evaluation and non-SWaP Demonstration for C-sUAV Study Research project is designed to map small unmanned aerial vehicle (sUAV) effects space, empirically and by simulation, as a function of high power microwave (HPM) waveform to develop effective countermeasures.
Article

New university-led Air Force Center of Excellence focuses on securing autonomous systems operating in contested environments

2019-05-22
The researchers at the COE for Assured Autonomy in Contested Environments – all of which histories of innovation for Department of Defense problems of interest – will focus on the availability, integrity, and effective use of information by leveraging its diverse expertise in dynamics, mathematics, control theory, information theory, communications, and computer science.
Article

Software needs security, and security needs software: a scientific overview

2019-04-22
Software needs security. That's a consequence of using software to control critical systems. It's difficult because software is inherently a complex artifact, even when the code just consists of a single sequential program in a single programming language, with well-defined inputs and outputs. Of course, actual software rarely if ever has such a simple structure. Security needs software. That's a consequence of the complexity just mentioned. No process can ensure security at scale unless it is automated by using software itself: programming languages, verification tools, software platforms.
Article

AIA predicts flying air taxis, supersonic air travel, and space industry for 2050

2019-03-15
In the “What’s Next for Aerospace and Defense: A Vision for 2050” study, AIA, New York City-based McKinsey & Company, and other industry partners reveal a comprehensive 30-year, Industry 4.0 forecast of air travel and spaceflight based on improvements in automation and digitization, next-generation materials, alternative energy sources and storage, and increased data throughput.
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